Security / Privacy / Wallets
Optimizely Hack Replaced Crypto Payment Addresses
Malicious Optimizely scripts changed crypto payment addresses on affected websites. Researchers distinguish wallet receipts from estimated victim losses.

A payment address copied from a familiar website can still belong to an attacker. On November 16, malicious code distributed through Optimizely Web Experimentation replaced cryptocurrency addresses on affected pages. Report URI found infected scripts belonging to 178 organizations, including Ledger. Its investigation also identified card-skimming code and attempts to deliver iOS exploits. Those findings do not establish that every visitor lost money or had a device compromised. Report URI investigation
Malicious code in a trusted script
Optimizely supplies scripts that customers use to test website designs. Report URI says the attacker inserted a loader into the Project JavaScript field. The rest of the customer snippet stayed intact. Browsers fetched the altered files from Optimizely's own content-delivery domain.
The malicious code then ran inside pages that already trusted that supplier. A legitimate domain and HTTPS connection did not tell visitors whether the script's contents were safe. Technical findings
In a November 18 update at 14:49 UTC, Optimizely attributed the intrusion to a flaw in its account-signup process that allowed impersonation of users on targeted customer accounts. The company said it closed the vulnerability within three hours of detection, removed the injected code and contacted affected customers. It said the incident affected fewer than 5% of customers and only involved Web Experimentation. Optimizely incident record
Wallet receipts are not the same as victim losses
Early reporting cited roughly $7,040 received by attacker wallets. Bitquery's November 17 analysis estimates about $2,260 in victim payments across 19 transfers. It attributes much of the difference to a Bitcoin receipt from the attacker's own swap, rather than another victim payment.
Bitquery also flags a $51 TRX transfer that may have funded the attacker's network fees. Excluding it lowers its estimate to about $2,210. Both figures cover cryptocurrency payments. Stolen card details, cookies and other off-chain harm fall outside that estimate. Bitquery's transaction analysis

Checks for readers and site operators
If you copied a payment address from an affected website on November 16, compare your transaction's destination with the intended recipient's address through a separate trusted channel. Keep the transaction ID if you find a mismatch and report it to the service involved. A wallet can faithfully send to the address you provide even when the page supplied the wrong one. Bitquery publishes the observed attacker addresses for comparison. Payment investigation and evidence
For website operators, review which third-party scripts run on payment pages and keep evidence of changes. Scott Helme explains that Subresource Integrity can check a script against an expected hash, while Content Security Policy can restrict script sources and data destinations. Dynamic vendor scripts complicate hash pinning because their contents change. A report-only policy can help detect unexpected activity, but does not block it. Helme's follow-up
Report URI said all infected Optimizely files it observed were clean by November 16 at 23:11 UTC. Cleanup stops that delivery path, but cannot undo an earlier payment to a substituted address. The total impact on cards, accounts and devices remains unresolved in the sources reviewed. Cleanup update